



DNS Security: Fundamentals

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> Advanced DNS Security Training Program 24-27th November 2020









Agenda

- DNS Basics
- Architecture
- Forward and Backward Resolution



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Need for DNS





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What does DNS do?

- Translates Domain names to IP Addresses:
 - www.cdac.in. \rightarrow 196.1.113.45
 - www.cdac.in. → 2405:8a00:6029::45
- ... and back:
 - 196.1.113.45 \rightarrow www.cdac.in.
 - 5.4.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.9.2.0.6.0.0.a.8.5.0.4.2.ip6.arpa.→ www.cdac.in.









DNS Fundamentals

- Application Layer protocol
- Runs over **UDP** and user port 53 (for queries and responses)
- Uses TCP for zone data transfers (between master and slave)
- Used by other Application Layer Protocols such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP for name resolution
- No single server in the World has all of the mappings for all of the hosts in the Internet







DNS Fundamentals

- Consistent hierarchical name space for referring to resources
 - Nodes at same level cannot have same names
 - Tree Structure
- A critical component of the Internet Infrastructure
- Globally Distributed, Scalable, and Reliable Database









Structure of DNS

- Decentralized *naming* system
- DNS *administration* is shared no single central entity administrates all DNS data
- This distribution of the administration is called *delegation*











Structure of DNS







1. Client asks to Local/ISP DNS server for lookup.











2.Local/ISP DNS Server asks Root DNS server.







3.Root DNS server reply with referral to TLD DNS "in".













4.ISP/Local DNS Server queries TLD DNS.







5.TLD DNS reply with referral to STLD DNS "cdac.in".













6.ISP/Local DNS Server queries STLD DNS.







7. "cdac.in" STLD DNS Server gives the reply - i.e IP address of "www.cdac.in"







Elements of DNS

- Domain Name Space and Resource Records
 - A tree structure name space and data associated with the names
- Name Servers
 - Programs that hold information about the domain's tree structure
- Resolvers
 - Programs that extract information from name servers to respond to client's requests.










DNS Ecosystem







Stub Resolver

- DNS Client is called Stub Resolver.
- Always Queries RR.
- RR Replied back to the Stub Resolver.









Authoritative Name Server

- They serve the actual reply i.e., the final translation of the *FQDN* to the IP address, as they are the authoritative source for the domain in question.
- DNS hosting companies typically manage the authoritative DNS servers for a domain name which, the users query through recursive resolvers.
- Master and Slave Configurations are maintained to increase availability









Recursive Resolver

- Also called as recursive DNS Server.
- The user queries to RR for domain lookup.
- RR queries the entire DNS Hierarchy for the final result.
- RR can also be Authoritative for some domains









DNS Server Types

- Root DNS Server
 - Root Servers(A to M)
 - Instances
- Authoritative DNS Server
 - Master
 - Slave
- Recursive DNS Server
- Stub Resolver








DNS Centralized or Decentralized ?

• Centralized or Decentralized ??











DNS Root Server

- Top of the DNS Hierarchy.
- Contains the information(root zone) of all TLD (e.g. in, org, com, gov etc).
- There are 13 root Name Servers, named A to M, maintained by 12 independent organisations.
 - Each root server is a copy and none of them are special.
 - There are several **instances** (997 as of Jul 2019) of all the root Servers across the World.
 - In India we have **instances** of **D,E,F,I,J,K,L** Root Servers across the country.
- Root name server operations currently provided by volunteer efforts by a very diverse set of organizations







Why 13 root servers?


- Historic Reasons
 - In IPv4, routers tend to fragment packets if the next receiver cannot receive a packet beyond a certain size
 - All IP protocol implementations should minimally support packet size of 576 bytes (including 20 byte header)
 - So if a packet is of <= 576 bytes, it can be transmitted without fragmentation
 - Even if it were part of a large packet, and fragmented, it can always be reassembled, as the size of the DNS packet is fixed at 512 bytes (in the first RFC of DNS).
 - Initially all the root servers did not have commonality in their names, varying from 15 bytes to 31 bytes; - 'NS' record;
 - 'A' record the address record includes the root server operator also, and can be represented by 16 bytes;
 - 14 name servers could have fit in; However it was decided to stick with 13, to allow room for future expansions and to add 'options'







Root Name Servers



Courtesy: Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach by James Kurose and Keith Ross, 6th Edition, 2013









Root Name Server Operators

Hostname a.root-servers.net b.root-servers.net c.root-servers.net d.root-servers.net e.root-servers.net f.root-servers.net g.root-servers.net h.root-servers.net i.root-servers.net j.root-servers.net k.root-servers.net l.root-servers.net m.root-servers.net


IP Addresses 198.41.0.4, 2001:503:ba3e::2:30 192.228.79.201, 2001:500:200::b 192.33.4.12, 2001:500:2::c 199.7.91.13, 2001:500:2d::d 192.203.230.10, 2001:500:a8::e 192.5.5.241, 2001:500:2f::f 192.112.36.4, 2001:500:12::d0d 198.97.190.53, 2001:500:1::53 192.36.148.17, 2001:7fe::53 192.58.128.30, 2001:503:c27::2:30 193.0.14.129, 2001:7fd::1 199.7.83.42, 2001:500:9f::42 202.12.27.33, 2001:dc3::35 f/iiref coednssecurity.in @IIRnEF

Manager VeriSign, Inc.

University of Southern California (ISI)


Cogent Communications University of Maryland NASA (Ames Research Center) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. US Department of Defense (NIC) US Army (Research Lab) Netnod VeriSign, Inc. RIPE NCC ICANN

WIDE Project



बोडेक Query Volumes in "A" Root Server

Query Volume (Millions/Day)





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DNS Record Types

- A Record
 - Maps a FQDN to an IP address; Most often used record type
- NS Record
 - Indicate which name servers are authoritative for the Zone / domain
- TXT Record
 - Type of Resource Record;
 - Associates arbitrary text with a host
 - Typically used for verification and email validation
- MX Record
 - Used by Mailservers to determine where to deliver email
 - Used in conjunction with 'A' record;
 - Should point to the mail server, (should point to the 'A' record, which will give the IP address; and should not directly give the IP address);
- PTR Record
 - Resolves an IP address to a domain or host name
 - Should be separately configured and hosted









DNS Query Types

- Recursive Query
- Iterative Query
- Inverse (Reverse) Query











Recursive Query - Illustration







































































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



















































































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






In Reality ...














Forward and Reverse Lookup







Public DNS Recursive Resolver


- DNS Resolvers are the critical components within the DNS Ecosystem
- Our Public DNS resolver for IPv4 and IPv6 is available at:
 - IPv4: 223.31.121.171
 - IPv6: 2405:8a00:8001::20
- Optimized Configuration
 - Compliance with RFC 7706








Public DNS Resolvers








Public DNS Resolvers in India

















Analyzing Newly Registered Domains with Covid-19 Themes

- 136,000+ domains have been registered
- Many of the domains appear to be:
 - Offering Malicious Coronavirus-Related Maps
 - 'Convenient' Mobile Apps to Track COVID-19
 - Advertising Coronavirus Services, Products
 - Malvertising on Coronavirus News Stories
 - Fostering Panic via Disinformation
- 1065 domains are registered with '.in'
 - 700 are found to be malicious



COVID19 Themed Domain Registrations (2020-03-27)





40,000







Thank You



